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ABSTRACT 
Internet of things (IoT) devices are emerging technology and everyday devices used worldwide that puts convenience at our 
fingertips through the collection and analyzation of our physical environment via the use of sensors and internet-connected 
devices. But that convenience came with the cost of IoT attacks tripling in number within the first half of 2018 compared to 
the number of IoT attacks in 2017 (Kaspersky Lab, 2018). In terms of home user devices, there are smart and fitness watches, 
refrigerators, and home assistants like the Google Home Assistant and the Amazon Echo Dot, and more. Although these devices 
aide in making life easier, IoT devices are prone to the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks that come with being connected to the 
Internet. Yet, at the same time, these devices are used to create smart homes. Research by OWASP and Lopez et al. (2018) has 
shown that there are several security threats to IoT that demonstrate the need to create stronger security practices. This project 
investigates ongoing research of IoT exploitation, particularly by botnets, to produce simple implementation recommendations 
and secure practices for home users. The aim of this research is to provide homes users with preventative methods to protect 
their smart homes and devices, so they do not fall victim to botnets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is estimated that there are around 23.14 billion Internet of Things (IoT) devices connected worldwide as of 2018 (IHS). That 
means there are approximately 3 devices per person based on the current worldwide population consensus, which is about 7.5 
billion, according to the United States Census Bureau (U.S. Bureau). IoT is a developing technology that uses sensors and 
devices to improve communication and collect, process, and analyze user data with the concept of IoT being able to allow users 
to uniquely and ubiquitously identify, access, and control things (Awad and Ali, 2018). This technology exists as virtual 
assistants, kitchen appliances, security systems, and watches to name a few. They also expand the functionality of the Internet 
by “increasing the ability to connect multiple devices.” (Awad and Ali, 2018) The ability to connect multiple devices benefits 
users with autonomy and convenience, particularly when they are used to create smart homes. Smart homes are homes that 
connect multiple internet-connected devices and sensors to achieve remote monitoring, access, and control (remote and local) 
of a user’s residence via a phone or computer (Awad and Ali, 2018; Oxford).  The devices promote comfort, convenience, 
security, and entertainment for a better user experience (Solaimani, Keijzer-Broers, Bouwman, 2013) 
IoT devices, like any internet-connected device, present security challenges; and like personal computers, tablets, and smart 
phones they collect, process, and analyze personal and sensitive information. Unlike devices such as computers, tablets and 
smart phones, IoT nodes1 have a resource-constraint nature that does not allow traditional defense practices to be directly 
enforced (Lopez, Uribe, Cely, Torres, Guataquira, Castro, Marmol, Nespoli, 2018). The lack of traditional defense practices in 
IoT devices can increase attack surface, which can be used to violate the C.I.A. triad. Attack surface is an element of defense-
in-depth that comprises of all the different points an attacker can use to gain access to a system. These points are the reachable 
and exploitable vulnerabilities (Lopez et al., 2018; Northcutt, 2011). The C.I.A. triad is a measure of security level and 
represents the principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability within information security. The goal of the triad is to 
keep data and information safe from unauthorized users and unauthorized alterations, all the while remaining available to 
authorized user. The triad can be violated through the exploitation of IoT vulnerabilities, which in turn increases the IoT attack 
surface. 
1 Node: A member of a network of a point where one or more functional units interconnect transmission lines. 
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According to Kaspersky Lab IoT report, “in the first half of 2018, IoT devices were attacked with more than 120,000 
modifications of malware. That’s more than triple the amount of IoT malware seen in the whole of 2017.” (Kaspersky Lab, 
2018) The significant increase in malware for IoT devices was sparked in 2016 with the Mirai botnet outbreak. A botnet is a 
network of computers infected with malicious software and controlled as a group without the owners' knowledge, typically 
used to send spam, perform distributed denial of service attacks, etc. (Oxford) Essentially, the infected device becomes a zombie 
awaiting orders from the master computer. For example, the Mirai botnet’s purpose was to join infected computers together to 
form a large botnet to launch distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks. DDOS is a form of denial of service in which a web 
server or other computer system is maliciously overwhelmed by spurious requests from many computers in different locations 
on the Internet, in order to make it inaccessible or unusable (Oxford). The devices infected were Linux or Unix-based. The 
infected devices – routers, IP cameras, DVRs, etc) – took orders using a command and control (C2) server to prevent being 
monitored. It either awaited commands to launch a DDOS attack or a brute force attack to infect other devices (NJCCIC, 2016; 
Margolis, Oh, Jadhav, Jeong, Kim, Kim, 2017). IoT technology is growing and, as mentioned earlier, there is a need to 
strengthen its security. As vulnerabilities remain outstanding for IoT devices, the attack surface will only grow with the 
development of IoT technology. Other botnets were created after Mirai using similar methods such as Imeij and TheMoon. 
The contribution of this paper is as follows: 
a) Review existing IoT vulnerabilities. 
b) Detailed review about how botnets affect IoT devices and smart homes. 
c) Propose simple implementation recommendations and secure practices for home users. 
d) Application of proposed implementation recommendations and secure practices for home users. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Literature review discusses smart homes, IoT networks, IoT threats and 
weaponization, and IoT exploitation. Results discuss in detail the recommendation and secure practices. Methodology describes 
how the proposal of implementation recommendations and secure practices for home users is created. Conclusion presents 
relevant conclusions found during research and future works. Finally, appendix shows illustrations found during research that 
may further some understandings. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Smart home networks are connected through more than just the wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi). Devices can also connect using radio 
frequency identification (RFID), Bluetooth, near field communication (NFC), internet pool (IP), electronic product code (EPC), 
and wireless sensor networks (WSN) (Awad and Ali, 2018). Regardless of the connection type, it is important for smart home 
users to protect their home from within and from outside. An attack from within the home uses technology that already exists 
in the home using the wired and wireless connections to exploit the vulnerable technology connected to the network. Outside 
attacks use the gateway to gain access. The gateway is a hardware device such as a router or server, that allows traffic to flow 
in and out of the network and is connected to the outside service provider by the access network (Chaqfeh and Mohamed, 
2015). For example, Chaqfeh mentions that a direct attack on a gateway through Web server or a CGI vulnerability can result 
in an attack on an entire household. This outside attack is possible because, as stated earlier, the gateway is what allows the 
flow of traffic in and out of a network. An in-home attack, Chaqfeh also mentioned is “an attacker disguising itself as the 
internal user through the interactive DTV, IP set top box or home pad or accesses it illegally through other means to control 
the home appliances (Chaqfeh and Mohamed, 2015).”  
Smart homes can be infiltrated in numerous ways. The following list few attacks based on connection used in smart homes 
(Ali and Awad, 2018; Oxford; Boreli, Gharakheili, Mehani, Sivaraman, Vishwanath, 2015;  Breitfuß, Haselsteiner, 2006; 
Madakam, Ramaswamy, Tripathi, 2015) 
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Table 1. Types of IoT connections and attacks 
The unsecure connection of IoT devices provided to attackers can be weaponized against major organizations and smart home 
users. For example, in 2016, the Mirai botnet mentioned earlier, played a role in a DDoS and TCP attack against a company 
called Dyn that provides DNS services to other major companies such as Zillow, Hersey, CNBC, and Soundcloud. The attacks 
targeted managed DNS infrastructure with the destination port 53. DDoS attacks use DNS protocol, which can make it difficult 
to determine legitimate traffic from attack traffic. According to Dyn, “the impact of the attack generated a storm of legitimate 
retry activity as recursive servers attempted to refresh their caches, creating 10-20X normal traffic volume across a large 
number of IP address. When DNS traffic congestion occurs, legitimate retries can further contribute to traffic volume. We saw 
both attack and legitimate traffic coming from millions of IPs across all geographies (Hilton, 2016).” The result of successful 
DDoS attacks can be devastating to an organization. Apart from the interruption of services, successful DDoS attacks can also 
result in financial loss or negatively affected brands.  
According to Ho, “smart homes have a larger and more complex attack surface than existing systems because of the broad 
range of heterogeneous home devices, the lack of a professional administrator to oversee and maintain these devices, a diverse 
set of variable and personalized security goals that each home resident might want, and potentially new attack scenarios enabled 
by cyber-physical, sensor-rich devices (Ho, Leung, Mishra, Hosseini, Song, Wagner, 2016).” Attackers can take advantage of 
the attack surface by exploiting the vulnerabilities in IoT devices to carry out attacks on the smart home or use the smart home 
to carry out attacks on a target. 
The Mirai botnet was able to spread using a Command and Control (C2) server. When Mirai was able to connect to the server 
via the infected device, the infected device would scan for other vulnerable devices. Once a victim has been identified, Mirai 
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would try logging in using brute-force2 over an SSH and telnet connection. If the device was able to login, it would send the 
information to another server and the Trojan would be downloaded onto the new device. When this process is complete, Mirai 
will attempt to conceal itself by deleting binary and “obfuscating its process name in a pseudorandom alphanumeric string 
(Margolis et al., 2017; Antonakakis, April, Bailey, Berhard, Bursztein, Cochran, Durumeric, Halderman, Invernizzi, Kallitsis, 
Kumar, Lever, Ma, Mason, Menscher, Seaman, Sullivan, Thomas, Zhou, 2017).” The Mirai botnet were able to spread to 
hundreds of thousands of IoT devices and attacked other companies such as OVH, Krebs on Security, and Liberia’s Lonestar 
Cell within the span of 4 months (Antonakakis, et al., 2017). Other IoT botnets such as TheMoon and Imeij were created and 
deployed after the Mirai outbreak. 
There is no perfect security solution to completely eradicate attacks like Mirai. However, the spread of Mirai could have been 
mitigated. Regarding IoT devices, the responsibility lies with both the manufacturer and home users. For instance, remote 
access is part of the luxury of smart homes. The user can monitor the home while at work or on vacation. But, when home users 
implement weak passwords or use default passwords, or when manufactures create devices with insecure network services, 
poor encryption and authentication methods, then remote access can leave a user’s devices vulnerable to attack, increasing the 
spread of malware and the IoT ecosystem’s attack surface. 
RESULTS 
The vulnerabilities found can be grouped into seven security groups: authentication, cryptography, education and training, 
network security, patch and update, physical security, and user interface (web, cloud, and mobile interface). Each group 
contains home user defense methods that list ways to defend against its respective vulnerability. The botnet-specific IoT 
vulnerabilities is comprised similarly. These lists will be further appended and analyzed to create a proposed list of simple 
implementation recommendations and secure practices for home users. The preposition will then be applied in a controlled 
home environment. In the process of curating the vulnerabilities of IoT devices and smart homes, methods of securing the 
devices for IoT manufactures became apparent.  
METHODOLOGY 
Using current research and literature from databases such as Science Direct and ACM digital Library, a list of known IoT 
vulnerabilities will be created and botnet-specific IoT vulnerabilities will be created. The methods of exploitation of the 
vulnerabilities will also be collected. Based on this information, a proposed list of simple implementation recommendations 
and secure practices will be created. Application of the proposed list will be tested through a simulation of using the proposed 
list to secure the devices and creating a botnet that will attempt DDoS attacks and possible propagation in a controlled 
environment. The implementation recommendations and secure practices should be simple enough for any home users to 
understand and implement, while retaining effectiveness. This will also be tested during the application process of this research. 
CONCLUSION 
Although there is no perfect security solution, there is still a need for manufactures to improve the security of IoT devices. 
Smart home security has become the responsibility of both home users and manufactures. Using the proposed implementation 
recommendations and security practices, smart home users can improve the security of their homes locally and remotely. 
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